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Abstract
Background: Fiscal policies are used to promote a healthier diet; however, there is still a call for real-world
evaluations of taxes on unhealthy foods and beverages. We aimed to evaluate the effect of an abrupt increase, of
respectively 80 and 40%, in the excising Norwegian taxes on candy and beverages on volume sales of candy and
soda. We expected sales to fall.
Methods: We analyzed electronic point of sale data covering approximately 98% of volume sales of grocery stores
in Norway. In two pre-registered models with weekly (log-)sales of taxed candy and soda from 3884 individual
stores, we modeled the difference between the jump (discontinuity) in the trend around the time of the increase in
taxes and the corresponding jump in the trend in a control season from the previous years (Model 1). In addition,
we modeled the difference between the intervention and the control season in their changes in average sales
(Model 2).
Results: Model 1 showed a 6.1% (one-sided 95% CI: not applicable (NA), 23.4, p-value = 0.26) increase and a − 3.9%
(95% CI: NA, 4.9, p-value = 0.23) reduction in the differences in the jump in the trends, for candy and soda,
respectively. The second model showed a relative decrease of − 4.9% (95% CI: NA, 1.0, p-value = 0.08) in the average
sales of candy and an increase of 1.5% (95% CI: NA, 5.0, p-value = 0.24) in sales of soda. Supplementary analyses
suggested that the results were sensitive to clustering on the time dimension.
Conclusions: When using two different quasi-experimental designs to model changes in volume sales of taxed
candy and soda, we were not able to detect reductions in sales that coincided with an increase in the taxes.
Variation across time makes it difficult to detect potentially small changes in sales even when using an entire
country’s worth of sales data on the level of individual stores. We speculate that the tax increases were too modest
to affect the prices to alter sales sufficiently.
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Background
The prevalence of overweight and obesity is a burden
worldwide [1]. Overweight and obesity are associated
with excessive intake of energy-dense and nutrient-poor
foods [2], which may lead to increased risk of morbidity
and mortality and other negative consequences affecting
the individual and society in general (e.g., financial
strain) [3–5]. To promote a healthier diet and tackle
obesity and non-communicable diseases, the World
Health Organization recommends the use of fiscal pol-
icies [6].
Historically, taxes on unhealthy products have been
motivated by revenues, but lately, several countries have
implemented taxes that aim to shift consumer consump-
tion towards a healthier diet [7], with taxes on sugar-
sweetened beverages (SSBs) being the most common.
A systematic review and meta-analysis evaluating the
prospective impact of food pricing on dietary consump-
tion supports taxation as a method to reduce the intake
of unhealthy foods and beverages [8]. Furthermore, tax-
ation of SSBs has been reported to lower sales of SSBs
with the potential to reduce energy and sugar intake [9].
However, a large proportion of studies on the effect of
taxes on unhealthy foods and beverages are modeling or
simulation studies, few are based on real-world evalua-
tions [9, 10]. Nonetheless, a recent systematic review
and meta-analysis using only real-world evaluations of
SSB-taxes reported an average decline in unhealthy bev-
erage purchases and dietary intake of 10% with a SSB-
tax of 10% [11]. However, the results were strongly
heterogeneous across study contexts and tax designs.
Compared to taxes on beverages, fewer countries have
implemented and evaluated taxes on unhealthy foods.
Mexico reported a 5.3% reduction in purchases of taxed
foods after implementing an 8% tax on energy-dense
nutrient-poor foods [12], whereas Hungary with a public
health tax [13] and Denmark with a tax on saturated fat
have reported smaller effects [14]. There is still a need
for real-world evaluations of taxes on foods and bever-
ages, especially taxes on unhealthy foods, to understand
their effects in different contexts [10, 11, 15].
In November 2017, Norwegian budget negotiations led
to an abrupt 80% increase in the tax on chocolate and
sugar products, from 20.19 NOK (2.09 EUR) per kg to
36.92 NOK (3.82 EUR) per kg; and a 40% increase in the
tax on non-alcoholic beverages, from 3.34 NOK (0.35
EUR) per liter to 4.75 NOK (0.49 EUR) per liter [16].
Both increases were implemented on January 1st, 2018.
Although the taxes were increased mainly to create reve-
nues, the potential public health benefits were empha-
sized by the government. With the abrupt increase in
the taxes, a natural experiment setting emerged.
This study aimed to identify the effect of the abrupt
increases in the existing Norwegian taxes on chocolate
and sugar products and non-alcoholic beverages on the
sales of these products. We expected the sales of taxed
products to fall; thus, our hypotheses were directional.
Methods
Study design
We evaluated the potential changes in sales during an
intervention season, representing the periods before and
after the abrupt increase in taxes on January 1st, 2018
(weeks 30–52 in 2017 and 1–23 in 2018), against the
changes in sales during a control season (weeks 30–52
in 2016 and 1–23 in 2017). To avoid the high variability
in sales during Christmas and the subsequent weeks, we
excluded four weeks on each side of the cutoff (January
1st) in each season. The weeks included in the main
analysis are presented in Figure S1 (see Supplementary
Figure S1, Additional file 1). The outcome variables were
weekly volume sales of candy and soda covered by the
taxes. The effects were estimated by two types of quasi-
experimental designs. In Model 1 (difference-in-discon-
tinuity), the (geometric) average sales over time were
modeled flexibly with splines before and after January
1st (excluding the window of eight weeks) and allowed
for different slopes in the control and intervention sea-
sons. The effect estimate in Model 1 represents the dif-
ference between the two seasons in the breaks (jumps)
of their trends before and after the time of the interven-
tion. In Model 2, time was modeled as fixed effects per
week number across the two seasons, and the effect
estimate represents the difference between seasons in
changes of the (geometric) average sales from the period
before to after January 1st.
Data and setting
We used longitudinal retail data, consisting of grocery
stores sales data as registered at checkout scanners in
the period June 2016 to June 2018 from the four largest
chains in Norway, collected by the Nielsen Company
Norway. Data consisted of sales in value (NOK) and vol-
ume, aggregated by product category, store, and week.
When compared against the official retail sales from Sta-
tistics Norway [17], the total data set covers about 98%
of the annual sales in Norwegian grocery stores [18].
This is an approximate estimate of the proportion of
sales, as definitions of a grocery store may vary.
The taxes do not differentiate between sugar or artifi-
cial sweetener content. Thus, irrespective of the type of
sweetener, we formed two groups of taxed products that
served as our primary outcomes: candy and soda. We
excluded seasonal products, products that are not typic-
ally associated with candy (marzipan, energy tablets,
etc.), and bulk candy (not provided in volume sales).
The taxed candy product group consisted of the follow-
ing subcategories: pastilles, other sugary products,
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bubblegum, sweets, caramels, chocolate (bars, figures,
boxes, etc.) and licorice. In the soda product category,
we included all subcategories of prepared soda with
added sugars and artificial sweeteners. For each grocery
store, we summed up the weekly volume sales within
each of the two product groups, candy in kg and soda in
liter, and used the natural log of these sums in the ana-
lyses. Thus, the analyses were based on the aggregated
volume sales of various product groups, not their
nutritional content (for which data was not available).
Statistical methods
The analyses were conducted in Stata version 15.1 soft-
ware (StataCorp. 2017. Stata Statistical Software: Release
15. College Station, TX: StataCorp LLC). Details on the
data preparation and statistical models are described in
the pre-registered analysis plan available online (https://
osf.io/pz4eg/) [19]. For each of the product groups
(candy and soda), we ran two different models: Model 1
with splines and Model 2 with week number as fixed
effects. Model 1 was an ordinary least squares regression
with sales in log-volume as the outcome:
ln yð Þi;t ¼ ashop þ β1 Xseason;i;tXdur ≥0i;t
 
þ β2Xseason;i;t þ β3Xdur ≥0i;t þ β4Xcontr
þ yf Xdur;i;t
 þ δf Xdur;i;tXseason;i;t
 þ ei;t :
β1 is the parameter of interest (tax effect) and captures
the difference between the discontinuity in the interven-
tion and control season, comparing the jump from late
November to early February (a local effect). β2 captures
differences in the level between intervention and control
season. β3 captures the shared jump from late November
to early February across the intervention and control
season. β4 is a vector of controls, including dummies for
Halloween and Easter, and the value of sales of non-
edible products (an exogenous proxy for total sale). ashop
captures fixed effects at the shop level. We modeled time
trends by restricted cubic splines using the mkspline
function in Stata with a total of three knots; one before
the cutoff (week number 30), one at the cutoff (week
number 5) and one after the cutoff (week number 23). y
captures shared time trends (the splines), and δ captures
how the intervention season deviates from this trend.
Model 2 modeled time by fixed effects of week
number:
ln yð Þi;t ¼ aweek þ ashop þ β1 Xseason;i;tXdur ≥0i;t
 
þ β2 Xseason;i;t
 þ β4Xcontr þ ei;t
Fixed effects at the week number level (aweek) replaced
joint and separate trend modeling. We controlled for
Easter and a proxy of total sales (β4), as described above.
Halloween fell on the same week number and was thus
not included because Model 2 includes fixed effects of
week number. As there are only two seasons, the model
resembles an interrupted time series design (the season
dummy captures the linear time trend), but it is parame-
terized as a difference-in-difference model. While Model
1 captured the local change around the cutoff, account-
ing for trends within seasons, Model 2 gave the differ-
ence between the intervention and control season in
their average change from before to after the cutoff.
To account for dependencies (e.g., autocorrelation)
within geography and time, respectively, we estimated
robust standard errors with two-way clustering on
time and at the level of municipalities using the Stata
user-written function reghdfe [20]. As we were only
interested in the potential fall in sales, we report one-
sided 95% CIs.
We ran several sensitivity tests, as described in the re-
sults section. Further, in the descriptive analyses of
changes in price, we calculated the price per volume for
each subcategory within the two product groups and re-
ported the means of these subcategories for taxed candy
and soda, respectively.
Ethics
The study does not qualify as human participant re-
search or medical research. No ethical approval was
needed according to national legislation.
Results
Sales data from 3884 stores were used in the analysis.
Descriptive mean weekly sales of taxed candy and soda
in the control and intervention season are presented in
Fig. 1. The figure indicates similar trends in sales with
an increase in sales in the weeks before week 52 and
with a drop in sales from week 1. After week 1, the sales
increase in both product groups.
Descriptive results of weekly volume sales for both
product groups by each season are presented in Table 1.
The upper panel shows the average sales per week be-
fore and after January 1st for the full seasons (week 27
to 52 and week 1 to 26 the following year), and the
lower panel shows the average weekly sales for the sea-
sons used in the main analyses (excluding seven weeks
during the summer and excluding an eight-week window
centered on January 1st).
Model 1 (estimating the local effect) yielded a 6.1% in-
creased volume sale of taxed candy in the intervention
season compared to the control season, and a reduction
in sales of soda corresponding to a difference of − 3.9%
(Table 2). These numbers represent the differences in
the estimated jumps in the trends, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
As one coefficient was in the opposite direction of our
predictions, and the other yielded a one-sided p-value of
0.23, the results were inconclusive.
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Model 2 estimated the difference in changes between
the average sales before and after the cutoff (rather than
the local jump around the cutoff). Analysis with Model 2
revealed a reduction in sales of candy corresponding to a
difference of − 4.9% when comparing the intervention
season to the control season (one-sided p-value = 0.08).
The analysis of soda yielded a 1.5% increase in sales,
contrary to our prediction (see Table 2). The coeffi-
cients of the two analyses using Model 2 were in the
opposite direction of the local model (Model 1). A
table that includes all regression coefficients in the
main analyses is presented in Supplementary Table S2
in Additional file 1.
Due to the null results of our main analyses, we did
not analyze potential substitute products and we did not
emphasize one model over the other, as described in the
preregistration [19].
Supplementary analyses
As it is likely that the effect of the taxes varies with
cross-border shopping possibilities, we conducted a sub-
sample analysis excluding municipalities categorized as
high cross-border shopping municipalities (see Supple-
mentary Text S3, Additional file 1). Results were not dif-
ferent from the main analyses (Supplementary Text S4
and Table S5, Additional file 1).
Fig. 1 Mean ln (volume) weekly sales of taxed candy (top) and taxed soda (bottom). X-axis show week number of the year. Lowess and linear fits
are for illustrative purposes
Table 1 Descriptive mean (±SD) weekly store volume sales of
taxed candy and taxed soda
Taxed candy (kg) Taxed soda (liter)
Control Intervention Control Intervention
Complete seasons
Pre 165 (62) 162 (52) 1882 (333) 1864 (370)
Post 143 (31) 140 (39) 1790 (210) 1812 (266)
Change - 21 (−13.0%) - 22 (−13.7%) - 92 (−4.9%) - 52 (−2.8%)
Seasons as in analyses
Pre 148 (11) 152 (14) 1778 (116) 1788 (152)
Post 150 (31) 148 (42) 1818 (210) 1873 (238)
Change 2 (1.1%) - 4 (−2.6%) 40 (2.3%) 85 (4.8%)
Pre/post signifies pre or post the cutoff (January 1st). SD Standard deviation
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To evaluate robustness in terms of the choice of pe-
riods, we excluded an additional two weeks on each side
of the cutoff in each season, resulting in the exclusion of
twelve weeks per season. Analyses of these data gave
similar results as the main analyses, except in Model 1
for taxed candy, which showed an estimated local
increase in sales of 16% in the intervention season (see
Supplementary Table S6, Additional file 1).
In addition to the above pre-registered sensitivity ana-
lyses, we ran analyses based on Model 2, where the
changes in the intervention season were compared
against the average changes of all previous seasons for
which we were able to obtain reliable data (2012–2017,
five seasons). The analysis yielded coefficients
corresponding to a − 3.9% one-sided 95% CI [NA, − 0.1]
reduction in sales of candy (one-sided p-value = 0.05)
and a 5.5% [NA, 9.3] increase in soda sales, one-sided
p-value = 1.0, see Supplementary Table S7, Additional
file 1.
Factors that change sales differentially in the control
and treatment seasons (e.g., if the weather was warmer
in the second part of the control season) could confound
our results. Such changes would also affect product
groups similar to the taxed products and can be netted
out in a triple difference (DiDiD) design. To estimate
DiDiD models, we included observations of sales of simi-
lar, non-taxed products into our data sets, comparing
candy to snacks and soda to bottled water. The DiDiD
Table 2 Exponentiated regression coefficients of the tax effect for the main models
Candy Soda
Model 1 (local) Model 2 (average) Model 1 (local) Model 2 (average)
Tax effect 1.061 0.951 0.961 1.015
One-sided 95% CI [NA, 1.234] [NA, 1.010] [NA, 1.049] [NA, 1.050]
One-tailed p-value 0.26 0.08 0.23 0.24
CI Confidence intervals. NA Not applicable due to one-sided CIs
Fig. 2 Sales of taxed candy (top) and taxed soda (bottom). Figures show intervention season (light grey line = predicted values) and control
season (dashed dark line = predicted values) from Model 1. Dots represent weekly mean observations. X-axis show week number of the year
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effect estimate from this analysis shows how a taxed
product group deviates from a control product group in
terms of differences between the pre-post change in the
intervention season and the pre-post change in the con-
trol season. These analyses showed an estimated − 7.2%
[NA, 0.5] (p-value = 0.06) reduction for candy and 0.8%
[NA, 17.3] (p-value = 0.47) increase for soda (See
Supplementary Table S8, Additional file 1).
To explore how clustering on time influenced the un-
certainty of the estimates in the main models, we
inspected CIs and p-values based on standard errors that
only accounted for clustering on municipalities (not on
time as in the main analyses). This reduced the uncer-
tainty substantially (e.g., Model 2 for candy gave 0.951
[NA, 0.959], p-value < 0.001), and suggests that the high
level of uncertainty in the estimates is mainly driven by
dependencies within time (e.g., co-movements in sales
across the stores).
Impact on prices
When hypothesizing a fall in sales, we presumed that
the prices on taxed products would be higher after the
intervention (the tax increases). The volume price of
taxed candy increased 5.8 percentage points more in the
intervention season in comparison to the control season,
and the same figure for taxed soda was 8.0 percentage
points (see Table 3).
Discussion
In the context of an abrupt increase in taxes on candy
and soda implemented January 1st, 2018, in Norway, we
assessed the differences between the season of the inter-
vention and a control season in terms of changes in sales
of taxed products from the periods before and after
January 1st. Using two different quasi-experimental
models to analyze changes in volume sales, we were not
able to consistently detect reductions that coincided with
the increases in the taxes. The uncertainty of the effect
estimates was high, which can be attributed to high vari-
ation in sales over time (that is not captured by model-
ing of covariates, seasonality, and trends). There was no
reliable local effect before to after the intervention, and
no decline in the average sales of soda, but the reform
may have had a small but meaningful effect on the
average sales of candy. However, the statistical evidence
is weak. The average model (Model 2) suggested a re-
duction of 4.9% in sales (p-value = 0.08), but the results
of the local model (Model 1) was in the opposite direc-
tion. The supplementary analysis of taxed candy with
additional control seasons back to 2012 yielded a reduc-
tion in sales of 3.9% (p-value = 0.05), and the analysis of
candy with snacks as a control product gave a 7.2% re-
duction (p-value = 0.06). P-values in this range are not
unexpected given the four main analyses and the twelve
supplementary analyses.1 Descriptive analyses showed
that the price per volume across subcategories of candy
and soda increased during the intervention season by re-
spectively 5.8 and 8.0 percentage points beyond the
changes in the control season.
The present results partly contrast with some of the
past literature on the impact of taxes on unhealthy foods
and beverages, especially concerning beverages. Empir-
ical studies from Mexico and the US reveal reductions in
sales or purchases of beverages after implementation of
taxes on beverages, however, with varying effects [21–
24]. Findings from the tax on beverages in Philadelphia
in the US, indicated an overall reduction of 38% in sales
of taxed beverages, despite large increases in volumes
sales in bordering zip codes [24]. Furthermore, sales in
Berkeley one-year post implementation of a SSB-tax de-
clined by 9.6%; however, it increased by 6.9% in non-
Berkeley stores [25]. Average weekly sales in Barbados
decreased with 4.3% following implementation of a SSB-
tax, compared to expected sales without a tax [21]. A
study using self-scanned purchases from a panel of 6253
Mexican households reported a 6% reduction in taxed
beverages after the implementation of a SSB-tax [23]. As
an example of more inconclusive results, the evaluation
of a French soda tax reported mixed evidence from
analyses of purchase responses [26].
In comparison with some of the results on beverages,
evaluations of taxes on unhealthy food products show
smaller reductions or substitution effects in purchases
[12–14, 27]. For example, evaluations of the tax on
energy-dense foods in Mexico revealed a decrease in
purchases of 5.3% on taxed foods (in 2014–2016) when
compared to a period without taxes (2008–2012) [12].
In contrast to our findings, Steen and Ulsaker (2019)
reported a 23% reduction in chocolate sales and an 11%
reduction in soda sales when evaluating the same in-
creases in the Norwegian tax on a smaller sample from
the same data as used in the present study [28].
Table 3 Mean (±SD) weekly volume price of taxed products
with the season as in analysis (NOK)
Taxed candy (price per kg) Taxed soda (price per liter)
Control Intervention Control Intervention
Pre 289.7 (3.8) 298.2 (6.2) 22.4 (0.4) 22.6 (0.6)
Post 296.4 (4.6) 322.3 (4.1) 21.7 (1.0) 23.7 (0.9)
Change 6.7 (2.3%) 24.1 (8.1%) −0.7 (−3.1%) 1.1 (4.9%)
Pre/post signifies pre or post the cutoff (January 1st). NOK Norwegian currency
(kroner). SD Standard deviation
1Although our tests are not independent, the high probability of
obtaining at least one p-value below 0.05 can be illustrated by
assuming a true null and 16 independent tests, 1-(0.95)16, which gives
a probability of 56%.
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One difference between several of the studies cited
above, and the present one is that we have accounted for
dependencies within each time unit by calculating stand-
ard errors that are cluster-robust at the dimensions of
both time and geography. To illustrate the impact of
such dependencies, we ran a model without adjusting
for clustering on time, and we obtained a substantial re-
duction in the estimated uncertainty. However, the infer-
ence in that model assumes independence among the
observations between the geographical clusters, which
means that unmodelled co-movement in the sales at the
national or cross-regional level (due to sales promotions,
weather, sports events, etc.) produce pseudo-replication.
For more details on cluster-robust inference, see Cam-
eron et al. (2006) [29] and Abadie et al. (2017) [30].
Note, however, that several studies use aggregated data
for which clustering is not an issue [12, 21].
Taxing unhealthy foods and beverages have become
more common, yet it is still difficult to compare effects
between countries. The contexts differ in terms of initial
intake levels of the taxed products, the level and design
of the tax, product market, economy, and cross-border
shopping. Furthermore, other uncertainties and differ-
ences related to price transmission, consumer response,
and substitution patterns make comparisons challenging.
Although the meta-analysis by Teng et al. (2019) re-
ported that the equivalent of a 10% SSB-tax was associ-
ated with an average decline in beverage purchases and
dietary intake of 10%, they concluded that context and
tax design might be just as important as the tax level in
designing SSB-taxes for maximum impact [11]. Other
studies suggest that for taxes to affect consumption,
taxes need to increase prices for consumers with 20% or
more [6, 10], which is substantially more than our esti-
mated differences from pre to post tax of 5.8 and 8.0
percentage points for candy and soda respectively.
The increase in the taxes should have made an 80-g
chocolate bar increase with about 1.5 NOK (0.14 EUR)
which includes the value added tax of 15%, and a 0.5-l
soda should have increased with about 0.8 NOK (0.08
EUR). The absolute price of the products varies substan-
tially between periods, different types of products, and
brands. The absolute change in price for the taxed prod-
ucts is unknown as the stores set the price on products,
whereas the taxes are levied producers of the products.
Although we reported the changes in price per volume,
we do not have access to details about differences in
sales between brands. Therefore, our estimate of the
changes in price may not accurately reflect how much of
the tax was passed on to the consumers. Furthermore,
Norwegians use a small part of their income on foods
and nonalcoholic beverages (about 12%) and are consid-
ered to have high purchasing power [31]. Altogether,
this suggests that the tax level of unhealthy products in
Norway needs to be substantially higher for the con-
sumer to affect purchase behavior to a larger extent.
Nevertheless, the taxes were mainly increased to create
revenues. Thus, the increases in the taxes had the
intended effect. Taxes with the aim of improving public
health, need to be designed accordingly.
Strengths and limitations
This study is from a real-world setting, and our data
consist of almost all annual sales in Norwegian grocery
stores, which we consider as strengths. Additionally, in a
study like the present one, where the choices are numer-
ous regarding taxed product groups, comparison prod-
ucts, control periods, length of the intervention period,
and statistical modeling, the pre-registration of methods
and hypothesis is a major strength. This precludes the
possibility that we have tweaked our model to obtain
more interesting results or results in line with political,
government, or business interests.
The differences in the signs of the coefficients between
Model 1 (local effect) and Model 2 (average effect) may
be attributed to the high variability in sales over time. As
sales vary by weather conditions, marketing campaigns,
holidays, etc., we could have obtained higher precision if
we had achieved better control of variables that influ-
ence sales. The analysis that used data back to 2012 gave
a more powerful test, but it also implicated seasons that
were more distal to the intervention, and this data may
exhibit different seasonal patterns. Furthermore, the ac-
tual impact of the tax increases on consumer prices is
uncertain. It has been suggested that it can take at least
6 months until taxes are fully passed onto consumer
prices [32].
In the present study, we used differences in changes
as means to draw conclusions about the causal im-
pact of the tax policy. Although we modeled the pre-
existing trends in sales and controlled for a proxy of
total sales, we cannot control for unknown factors
that selectively affect sales of the taxed product
groups in the year of the intervention. This is, how-
ever, an inherent limitation of all observational stud-
ies of this kind. Furthermore, retail data from small,
independent stores with foreign products are not in-
cluded, nor is data from kiosks and gas stations. As
taxed products are sold in these venues, we cannot
exclude possible effects of the taxes in these outlets.
A limitation concerning the use of retail sales data is
that we cannot assess the potential impact on actual
consumption for different types of consumers.
Conclusion
Our results are inconclusive, as we could not consist-
ently detect changes in sales of taxed products after an
abrupt increase in taxes on candy and soda. High
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variation in sales across time resulted in high uncertainty
of the effect estimates, which underscores the import-
ance of adjusting standard errors for clustering on the
time dimension in policy evaluations. We speculate that
the tax increases were too modest to affect the prices to
alter sales sufficiently.
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